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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Government debt management in the euro
area is evolving rapidly. The introduction of
the euro in 1999 had a major impact on
the operations of debt managers as the
disappearance of exchange rate risks within the
euro area created the conditions for a pan-
European capital market. As a result, debt
managers have become direct competitors in
the European capital market. The decrease in
government deficit and debt ratios in the run-up
to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU),
resulting in a reduction in supply of
government debt instruments, and the rapid
expansion of electronic trading systems are
other developments which have affected the
environment in which debt managers operate.
This paper reviews recent developments in the
management of government debt in the euro
area, covering both theoretical and practical
aspects. In particular, it focuses on key aspects
of debt management, i.e. the objectives of debt
management, its organisation, the maturity of
debt, inflation-indexed debt, the currency
denomination of debt, the ownership of debt,
and debt issuing and trading practices.
The objectives of debt management agencies
in the euro area have remained more or less
the same: the financing of public debt at low
costs with acceptable risks. This focus on
budgetary costs differs from recent academic
literature on debt management, in which deficit
stabilisation is often regarded as an objective.
The aim there is to avoid increases in deficits
above 3% of GDP using a variety of debt
instruments.
The autonomy of debt management agencies
was already increasing before the start of EMU.
However, it received an additional boost
from the introduction of a more competitive
environment, as reflected in greater autonomy
for the larger debt management offices in
recent years, either as part of the national
ministry of finance or as a separate unit
outside the government sector. Increased
independence has gone hand-in-hand with
more detailed strategic goals and practical
guidelines for the agencies, often setting
targets or limits for key elements such as
maturity and refinancing risk.
The residual maturity of debt in the euro area is
converging, with the average maturity now
close to six years. Some high-debt countries
have seized the opportunity to expand longer-
term financing on more favourable terms while
a few others have increased the issuance of
short-term government bills, partly with a view
to establishing benchmarks in that segment of
the capital market. Another development in
this area, following the establishment of a euro
swap market, is the steering of the duration of
debt by use of interest rate swaps. This allows
debt managers to issue debt instruments in
the most liquid, longer-term capital market
segment (usually 10-year maturity) and at the
same time take advantage of lower short-term
interest rates.
Within the range of debt instruments issued,
inflation-indexed debt is increasingly popular
among debt managers, although starting from a
low level. Whereas, in the past, cost savings
and establishing credibility were the main
reasons for issuing this type of debt,
establishing one’s name in a market that is
potentially fast-growing now seems to be the
prime motivation. For investors, portfolio
diversification can be an important reason for
investing in this type of bond, despite low
inflation expectations. For pension funds in
particular, matching inflation-linked liabilities
is another reason.
After the changeover to the euro, government
debt managers put less emphasis on issuing
debt denominated in non-domestic currencies.
This mainly reflects the large pool of resources
now available in euro, reduced fears of
crowding-out and the opportunity to attract
foreign investors when issuing in the domestic
currency (euro). Less than 2% of government
debt in the euro area is now denominated in
currencies other than euro.5
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Foreign ownership of euro area government
debt has increased markedly, as the
introduction of the euro has made it much
easier to invest in the euro area, reducing the
national bias. Large increases in foreign
ownership were seen in particular in some
smaller euro area countries, where the share of
non-domestic ownership doubled in the space
of a few years.
Increased emphasis on the liquidity of
issuances, with a view to securing the lowest
possible funding costs, is reflected in issuance
and trading practices. Most bonds offered
today are standard, “plain vanilla” securities,
which are easy to trade. Nearly all euro area
debt managers distribute newly issued bonds
via primary dealers. Increasingly, government
bonds are traded on electronic trading
platforms.
Thus, overall, there is a tendency towards
convergence on key aspects of debt
management. Rather than representing a break
with the past, the introduction of the euro has
supported and strengthened trends already
under way. However, convergence has not been
equal in all aspects and is taking place at
different speeds. More recently, some
divergence in debt management operations
seems to be re-emerging, mainly reflecting the
desire of debt managers to be leading players in
niche areas.6
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1 INTRODUCTION
Government debt management practices in the
euro area are evolving rapidly. The working
environment of government debt managers
in the euro area has been transformed
considerably during the last few years. This has
changed debt management in many ways, often
with the effect of reinforcing existing trends.
The introduction of the euro in 1999 was a
major change, creating the conditions for a
pan-European capital market. Exchange rate
risks within the euro area no longer exist,
market conventions have been harmonised
and efficient linkages between European
settlement systems have been established. Debt
managers have become small to medium-sized
players in a larger European capital market,
instead of being the dominant player in the
national market. Consequently, competition
among debt managers has increased,
stimulating a more efficient primary market
and a deeper, more liquid secondary market.
Lower government deficits and debts have also
affected the work environment of debt
managers. From around 5% of GDP in 1995 the
average deficit in the euro area declined until
2000, when a position very close to balance was
reported.1 After peaking at above 75% of GDP
in 1997 the average gross government debt
ratio in the euro area declined until 2002, when
it stood at 69% of GDP. Reduced gross
borrowing needs prompted discussions on
which instruments to use to finance debt, how
to preserve liquidity in the market, and what
role there is for interest rate swaps.2 This
debate has partly abated with the return of
significant deficits (averaging 2¾% of GDP in
the euro area in 2003) and a new rise in the
average debt ratio in the euro area (to more than
70% of GDP in 2003).
An additional factor that has had an important
impact on debt management is the introduction
and expansion of electronic trading systems,
which has changed the organisation of
securities trading.
1 Part of the favourable budgetary development resulted from
sales of UMTS licenses, resulting in one-off receipts of about
1% of GDP.
2 Gross borrowing includes borrowing to finance the deficit
(net borrowing) and borrowing to finance redemptions.
3 See Favero et al. (1999) and Missale (1999) for comprehensive
studies on government debt management before EMU.
These developments have also influenced
theoretical thinking on government debt
management. In particular, the fiscal
constraints introduced in the Maastricht Treaty
have influenced work on deficit stabilisation
theory. The independence of the European
Central Bank (ECB) and the changed policy
constellation, with one monetary policy actor
and twelve national fiscal authorities that have
already adopted the euro, are also reflected in
the academic literature.
This paper reviews recent developments in
debt management in the euro area, focusing
on a few key aspects. Relevant theoretical
developments as well as practical innovations
in debt management since the start of EMU in
Europe are presented.3 The key aspects focused
on are the objectives of debt management
(Section 2), the organisation of debt
management (Section 3), the maturity of debt
(Section 4), inflation-indexed debt (Section 5),
the currency denomination of debt (Section 6),
the ownership of debt (Section 7), and issuing
and trading practices (Section 8). The final
section contains our conclusions and looks
at some upcoming challenges for debt
management in the euro area.
2 GOVERNMENT DEBT MANAGEMENT
OBJECTIVES
Theories on optimal government debt
management have emphasised a variety of
goals over time. They include macroeconomic
stabilisation, developing national financial
markets, supporting monetary policy, and
minimising costs and risks. The inclusion of
macroeconomic goals for government debt
management clearly distinguishes it from debt
management in the private sector where cost
considerations dominate. In addition, assets7
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and liabilities in private businesses are usually
directly linked (e.g. issuing a bond or equity to
finance an expansion or a corporate takeover),
while in government such direct links are
usually absent.
The starting point for any discussion on
debt management objectives is the seminal
paper by Tobin (1963). Tobin regarded
government debt management primarily as
a tool for macroeconomic stabilisation, with
minimisation of interest costs coming
secondary, and risk minimising not playing any
role at all. Thus, in an economic upturn, the
issuance of new debt should be concentrated on
long maturities, driving up long-term interest
rates, thus contributing to a cooling off of the
economy.
Tax smoothing is the key government objective
in Barro’s work on debt management (1999).
Under his approach debt levels are permitted
to vary over time to allow smooth tax rates,
which is welfare-improving as tax rate changes
create economic distortions. Issuing debt
with interest payments contingent on certain
developments would be optimal. For example,
GDP-indexed debt could be issued with returns
being dependent on the growth rate of GDP. In
a high growth environment investors could
enjoy a higher return on these bonds without
the government having to increase tax ratios as
high growth improves the budget balance
via built-in stabilisers. In the absence of
GDP-indexed bonds, attention focuses on
combinations of conventional instruments
(nominal bonds, indexed bonds and foreign
currency bonds) that may produce similar
results (see e.g. Missale, 1999). Which
combination of instruments is optimal then
depends on the types of shock that hit the
economy. Inflation-indexed debt, for instance,
is preferable in the event of demand shocks. In
the case of a positive demand shock, rising
GDP decreases the budget deficit via automatic
stabilisers, which is countered by rising
nominal interest spending due to higher
inflation. The choice of debt maturity can also
play a role in smoothing tax rates (Angeletos,
2002).
Reflecting the new fiscal framework in EMU,
Missale (2000) suggests deficit stabilisation as
the main objective of debt management. He
argues that fluctuations in the deficit-to-GDP
ratio can be minimised via an appropriate
selection of debt instruments on the basis of
inflation and real GDP-sensitivity of interest
payments. The optimal structure depends on
the sign and strength of the correlations
between inflation, real GDP growth and
interest rates. Missale models the changes in
optimal debt management under EMU
following the introduction of a single monetary
policy in the euro area, which affects the
aforementioned correlations. Assuming the
ECB gives high priority to price stability, his
model shows that a combination of long-term
conventional debt and inflation-indexed
debt would be optimal for the purpose of
deficit stabilisation. The cost of using debt
instruments to reduce the likelihood that
budget balances will breach the 3% of GDP
deficit limit need to be weighed against the cost
of the deficit exceeding this limit.
Turning to practice, the primary objective of
debt management agencies in the euro area is to
ensure financing of the annual borrowing at
the lowest possible (medium-term) cost with
acceptable risks, although precise wordings
and emphasis differ from country to country.
The operational targets or guidelines for debt
management units differ more substantially.
Often, these are based on asset-liability studies
or cost-at-risk models, weighing interest costs
against budgetary risks. Targets can take the
form of a target (range) for the average maturity
or the (modified) duration,4 subject to certain
restrictions such as quantitative limits on the
use of interest rate swaps. For example, the
French debt agency had a 2004 target of an
average maturity (after interest rate swaps) of
5.3 years, implying a reduction of nearly half a
4 The modified duration measures the change in the current
value of the debt portfolio when the yield of the portfolio
changes by 1 basis point.8
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year compared to 2003. The Belgian debt
agency has to operate within limits on the
shares of different maturities in total debt, such
as a 25% cap for total euro-denominated debt
on which the interest rate needs to be reset
within a year. In the Netherlands, after
focusing on duration, the target is now the total
annual refinancing amount (including swaps),
which is set at a level of 9% of GDP.
These goals of European debt managers bear
little resemblance to the objectives identified
in the academic literature. Active support
for macroeconomic policies has lost ground.
This reflects reduced confidence in the
effectiveness of active demand management
and more integrated capital markets that limit
the scope for national debt policies. Tax
smoothing has also been ignored as a debt
management goal. Instead of focusing on the
budget with the aim of avoiding large changes
in taxes, debt managers focus more narrowly on
reducing government interest payments and
avoiding (the risk of) large fluctuations in these
payments. While, all other things being equal,
low interest rate costs contribute to lower
taxes, debt managers do not take interactions
with other budget elements into account.
This possibly results in sub-optimal debt
management from the tax-smoothing point of
view.
The lack of practical follow-up also applies
to the deficit stabilisation goal. Whereas the
optimal composition of debt depends on
types of shock and on co-variances between
macroeconomic variables, these are difficult to
predict and may be subject to change. Thus,
the benefits of adapting debt management
practices for deficit stabilisation seem limited.
Although the objectives identified in academic
literature do not coincide with the goals of the
debt managers, Missale (2001) finds that actual
government debt structures closely resemble
the optimal debt composition from a deficit-
stabilisation point of view, with the shares
of inflation-indexed debt being somewhat
below optimal levels. He concludes that
current debt structures provide a sufficiently
good insurance against macroeconomic
shocks, and help to reduce the risk that deficits
will go above 3% of GDP.
Nevertheless, the gap between the theory and
the practice of debt management is striking. As
mentioned by Leong (1999), possible causes
for this discrepancy include the nature of the
theoretical models used (with taxpayers and
bondholders basically coinciding). Differences
in accounting conventions may also explain the
different focuses. Whereas changes in the
market value of the debt portfolio are of central
importance in most theoretical models, debt
managers and policy makers in general focus
on annual budgets.
3 ORGANISATION OF DEBT MANAGEMENT
The organisational structure of debt
management is linked to prevailing views
on the goals that debt management
should aim at. Putting the emphasis on
macroeconomic stability naturally leads to the
debt management task being entrusted to the
Ministry of Finance. Fear of interference with
monetary policy, on the other hand, may lead to
operational responsibilities being assigned to
the national central bank.
In line with a reduced role for macroeconomic
considerations in determining debt
management objectives, debt management
units were generally given more independence
in the 1990s. A stronger focus on “narrow” debt
management goals allowed for delegation to
separate units. In addition, higher product
complexity and competition among debt
managers require a higher degree of
operational independence and professionalism,
which is easier to accomplish in a non-
government unit. Cost considerations
sometimes also played a role in the decision to
delegate tasks to more independent units.5
5 In Germany, debt management was centralised in 2001,
expected to deliver interest payments savings of up to €0.75
billion per year.9
ECB




MATURITY While the process started in the 1990s, the
progress in capital market integration and the
subsequent increase in competition between
debt managers around the start of EMU
gave additional impetus to granting more
independence to debt managers. Thus, for
example, the debt management agencies of
the two main economies of the euro area,
Germany and France, were given increased
independence in their operations in 2001.
The precise organisation of debt management
differs from country to country (Currie et al.
2003). In some countries, there is an emphasis
on the role of portfolio management in debt
management, and operational responsibilities
are delegated to separate units outside the
Ministry of Finance, although the Ministry
ultimately remains responsible. Ireland is a
good example. Some other countries, such as
Belgium, France and the Netherlands, have
not gone that far, and maintain the debt
management unit as part of their Ministry of
Finance, but with more independence than
before. These countries emphasise the role that
debt management can play in public policy
(e.g. in maintaining well-developed financial
markets). Annex 1 presents an overview of the
organisation of debt management in the euro
area countries.
4 GOVERNMENT DEBT MATURITY
Government debt maturity is a key parameter in
debt management, as is reflected both in
academic literature and in practice. In theory,
issuing short-term debt is cheaper than issuing
long-term debt if the normal term structure
prevails. Taking just a short-run cost
perspective, the optimal policy would probably
be to borrow (a large amount) short-term and to
invest in the equity market (Campbell and
Shiller, 1996). Against this, the refinancing
risk is higher for short-term debt. Frequent
refinancing implies a higher risk of having to
refinance debt at higher interest rates.
Financing at short-term rates adds to the
volatility of budget balances and of household
disposable incomes.
Explaining differences in debt maturities
between countries and over time, Missale and
Blanchard (1994) point to the role of the size of
the debt ratio. Looking from a time-consistency
point of view, they predict a negative relation
between debt and maturity when the debt ratio
exceeds 100% of GDP. Such high debt levels
would increase government incentives to
inflate the debt burden away. Consequently,
investors would much prefer short-term debt.
De Haan et al. (1995) argue that a positive
relation between size of debt and maturity can
sometimes be expected if a higher debt ratio
forces the debt manager to lengthen maturity to
avoid a crisis of confidence. In the model of
Drudi and Giordano (2000), negative relations
between the size and the maturity of debt
prevail at low and extremely high debt levels.
In the first case, it reflects fears of inflating
away debt if debt becomes larger, while at
extremely high debt levels the default risk
premia become too large for governments to
issue long-term debt. In the intermediate range,
the relation becomes positive, as governments
try to reduce refinancing risks of larger debt by
lengthening maturity.
Miller (1997b) considers the effects of
political instability on debt maturity. Political
instability causes inflation uncertainty,
reflected in higher long-term interest rates.
This increases incentives for governments to
issue a larger portion of debt with short-term
maturity.
The link between central bank independence
and debt maturity is also explored in academic
literature. A very high level of central bank
independence is a bulwark against inflationary
pressure from a government. Falcetti and
Missale (2002) argue that central bank
independence is more efficient in overcoming
time-inconsistency problems and in reducing
inflationary expectations than issuing
inflation-indexed or foreign currency10
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6 The lower limit for government securities to be eligible for
trading on EuroMTS, the European electronic platform for
government securities, is €5 billion.
7 The exchange rate risk premium was particularly high in Italy
(1.5 percentage point), but also significant in Spain (1.0
percentage point) and in Finland and Ireland (0.4 percentage
point) according to Blanco (2001) in a study in which Greece
was not included.
8 The relative contributions of liquidity and credit risk as the
main differentiating features of government bonds is subject
to debate (see e.g. Codogno et al. (2003) and Santillán et al.
(2000)).
Chart 1 Euro area government debt
according to original maturity
(% of total debt)
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over 1 year with fixed rate
denominated bonds. They attribute longer
maturities in the late 1980s to increased central
bank independence, reflecting increased
investor confidence in longer-run price
stability. With a larger volume of nominal
bonds outstanding, the effectiveness of
monetary policy may increase. Changes in
interest rates affect bond prices and thereby
wealth, which has some impact on private
consumption and output.
Based on the above considerations, the start
of EMU would suggest a lengthening of
maturities. Time-consistency concerns have
decreased with the independence of the ECB
because direct monetary financing has been
ruled out and price stability is set as the primary
objective of the ECB. Furthermore, debt levels
have come down in accordance with the rules
on budgetary discipline enshrined in the
Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth
Pact.
Apart from such macroeconomic
considerations, the maturity choice of euro area
debt managers since EMU has been partly
motivated by liquidity concerns, with low
liquidity premia contributing to low costs. The
development of EMU, with decreased cross-
border obstacles to trade, has led to an
increased focus on issuing standardised, “plain
vanilla” government bonds, especially with
10-year maturities. The size of these bond
issues is generally quite large compared to the
pre-EMU years due to the aim of achieving a
high degree of liquidity in the markets. While
issues of about €2 billion were standard in
smaller countries before the start of EMU,
the minimum is now €5 billion, with large
countries in the euro area having bond
issuances of over €20 billion.6
Substantially lower long-term interest rates in
the run-up to EMU and thereafter also created
incentives for a shift in focus to the long-term
segment of the capital market. This is reflected
in a rise in the share of euro area government
debt with original maturity of over 1 year and
fixed interest rates around the start of EMU and
a lower share of debt instruments linked to
short-term interest rates (short-term debt and
long-term debt with variable interest rates) (see
Chart 1). This increase took place in particular
in countries with previously less-disciplined
fiscal policies. The adoption of the common
currency caused the exchange rate risk
premium in interest rates to vanish.7 In
addition, credit risk premia may also have
decreased because of improved public finances
and limits on government deficits and debts
included in the Maastricht Treaty.8 Thus, from
a debt management perspective, joining EMU
has been a major contribution to achieving the
objective of cost minimisation.
With government deficits generally lower than
a few years ago, the possibility of issuing one
or more large 10-year benchmark bonds has
decreased, especially for countries with
smaller government debts. Governments11
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End of 1995 End of 1998 End of 2002 End of 2003
Austria 5.8 5.5 6.0 6.3
Belgium - - 6.1 5.9
Finland - 1)4.81) 4.5 3.9
France 6.3 6.3 5.9 5.9
Germany 4.9 6.0 6.0 6.3
Greece - 3.9 6.1 6.3
Ireland - - 4.5 5.8
Italy 4.5 5.2 5.6 6.1
Luxembourg - 7.0 2.3 1.9
Netherlands 6.9 6.5 6.1 6.0
Portugal - 3.8 4.5 4.3
Spain 2)3.72) 5.4 6.0 6.1
Euro area - - 5.8 6.0
Source: Annual reports of euro area debt managers and OECD (2003).
1) End of 1999.
2) End of 1996.
Table 1 Term to maturity of government debt in the euro area
(years)
9 Easier access by individuals to the primary and secondary
markets for government bonds via financial intermediaries
and the internet has also played a role in decreasing the
volume of retail debt.
10 Low short-term interest rates led Ireland to finance its entire
gross borrowing requirement (€4 billion) short-term in 2001.
have used various strategies to increase
the possibilities of borrowing at benchmark
maturities. Buy-back operations and bond
switching operations have been introduced or
extended, while non-tradable debt instruments,
such as retail debt, have decreased in size.9
Some additional room for issuing longer-term
benchmark bonds came from a decrease in
short-term financing. The share of short-term
debt fell, particularly in Belgium, Greece and
Italy, which all have very high debt ratios. For
example, in Italy the share of short-term debt
in total central government debt over a period
of 10 years decreased from over 60% (1993)
to around 25% (2003).
At the start of EMU government issuances were
heavily concentrated on 10-year bonds, with all
euro area debt managers active in that market.
The 3-, 5- and 30-year segments also remained
attractive, with about half of the debt managers
issuing at least one security in those segments
(Economic and Financial Committee, 2000a).
More recently, debt managers have selected
a somewhat wider spectrum of maturities,
including some reversion to issuing short-term
securities as reflected in the slight increase in
debt with original maturities of less than one
year as shown in Chart 1. Factors underlying
the renewed interest in issuing short-term
securities include the aim of establishing
benchmarks at the short end of the yield
curve. Furthermore, disappointing deficit
developments after 2000 resulted in unplanned
borrowing requirements, which are easier to
finance by issuing short-term debt. Short-term
debt can also help debt managers to even
out the redemption pattern over time. This is
often a secondary objective of debt managers,
to avoid the concentration of very large
borrowing requirements in one single year and
ensure frequent contacts with capital markets.
Finally, historically low short-term interest
rates favoured issuances in the short-term
segment.10
The outcome of these developments has been a
strong convergence of the residual maturity of
government debt to an average of around 6
years in 2003 (see Table 1). This process had12
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already started before the launch of the euro
(Favero et al., 1999). Broadly speaking, the
average residual maturity in the large majority
of countries is now within a 5.5 to 6.5 year
band, with exceptions in a few smaller
countries. Dispersion was larger before,
although limited data availability and caveats
in definitions and data collection call for
caution in interpretation, especially when
making cross-country comparisons.
The convergence in maturities can be seen
as contributing to a more homogeneous
transmission mechanism of monetary policy in
the euro area. However, it has to be taken into
account that government debt only plays a
minor role in the entire transmission process.
Of course, government debt levels also
continue to differ substantially between the
countries of the euro area, contributing to
differences in the strength of the transmission.
Furthermore, the residual maturity of
government debt can be a misleading indicator
for the transmission channel. Many debt
managers now use interest rate swaps (see
Box 1), making the concept of residual
1 Swaps can also be (and apparently have been) used to provide governments with high current revenues to artificially improve the
budget at the expense of future revenues (Piga 2001).
2 Higher deficits in recent years have increased the number of issuances of 10-year bonds. To avoid overshooting the targets for
maturity/duration, some debt managers have used reverse swaps.
3 As governments are big players, their behaviour may affect the functioning of the swap market. Remolona and Wooldridge (2003)
noted a ceiling on euro swap spreads, as governments enter the market to take advantage of short-term interest rates when
differences between government long-term interest rates and swap rates become large.
4 France has used swaps since 2002 and has estimated the gain at €200 million. The Dutch public debt manager has calculated that it
saved €111 million through the use of interest rate swaps in the period 1999-2001.
Box 1
INTEREST RATE SWAPS INCREASINGLY POPULAR
Interest rate swaps conducted by euro area government debt managers normally imply that the
debt manager receives the long-term interest rate from a counterparty and pays the short-term
interest rate. This shift to short-term interest rates allows governments to benefit from the
generally lower short-term interest rates without running the refinancing risk of this type of
debt (Ladekarl and Svennesen, 1999).1
The increasing popularity of interest-rate swaps is related to reduced government financing
needs. Combined with the policy of issuing high volumes of benchmark bonds to obtain
liquidity in these markets and government guidelines on the maturity of debt, this leaves debt
managers little choice for managing the short-term risk profile of government debt.2 Swaps
introduce more flexibility in debt management by separating liquidity from the risk profile.3
While issuing long-term benchmark bonds for which there is a liquid market, swaps allow the
cost advantages of short-term interest rates to be realised.4
Interest rate swaps are not without risks (Piga, 2001), such as counterparty risk: i.e. the risk
that the counterparty may no longer be able to fulfil its obligations. Authorisation for debt
managers to conduct swaps is therefore accompanied by several restrictions regarding the
minimum rating of counterparties, maximum risks per counterparty and/or overall maximum
risks. Only a limited number of government debt managers provide (non-standardised)
information on swap operations undertaken and the risks involved. The risks involved were
recognised by the French Minister of Finance, who temporarily suspended swap operations in
September 2002 in view of the high volatility of the financial markets.13
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11 A case in point is the issuance of indexed bonds in the UK in
1981, when the government had lower inflation expectations
than investors on account of its strong belief in its own anti-
inflation policy.
12 Liquidity is less of an issue if investors, institutional ones in
particular, want to hold this debt until maturity.
13 Governments dominate the market for indexed bonds, but
some private companies have also entered the market recently
(see European Commission, 2003).
14 Changes in the inflation-risk premium, the liquidity premium
or the tax treatment of indexed bonds may decrease the
reliability of such inferences (see ECB, 2003).
15 In this context, Margaret Thatcher referred to inflation-
indexed bonds as “sleeping policemen”.
maturities a less reliable indicator of the short-
term interest rate sensitivity of government
interest payments.
5 INFLATION-INDEXED GOVERNMENT DEBT
The benefits and drawbacks of inflation-
indexed bonds are much debated in academic
debt management literature. A discussion of
the pros and cons of inflation-indexed bonds
can be structured around the objectives of the
parties involved (Shen, 1995).
Treasuries may benefit from issuing inflation-
indexed bonds as investors do not need to be
compensated for inflation uncertainty, and thus
require a lower interest rate. Benefits may be
particularly large if the government’s inflation
expectations deviate from market
expectations.11 In addition, under some
circumstances, inflation-indexed bonds may
contribute to stabilising real expenditure and
thus result in some tax smoothing. Indexed debt
may be particularly useful for this purpose if the
macroeconomic shocks are predominantly
demand shocks, and inflation and growth are
positively correlated (Missale, 1999). In the case
of a positive demand shock, higher income
generates higher tax revenues, while higher
inflation will increase nominal interest
payments for indexed debt. For governments the
potential disadvantages of issuing inflation-
indexed bonds include reduced predictability of
nominal interest payments, resulting in larger
sensitivity of budgets to inflation, and greater
volatility, unless revenues are also inflation-
sensitive. Issuing this type of debt also risks
segmenting the market, with investors
demanding a liquidity premium for indexed
bonds, as the size of the market and trade in this
type of bonds is usually limited.12 It has also been
argued that the default risk premium of the
government may increase, as the option of
reducing the real value of debt via inflation is no
longer available. Price (1997) has documented
the main rationales for governments to issue
inflation-indexed debt in a number of countries.
Investing in indexed bonds offers investors
protection against inflation. This may be
particularly attractive for institutional
investors like pension funds, giving them the
opportunity to match their long-term, inflation-
sensitive pension liabilities. “Demonstration
effects” may help create a larger market for
inflation-indexed products if governments
issue this type of bond.13 This would provide
increased opportunities for inflation-risk-
averse investors to hedge against inflation.
Campbell and Shiller (1996) argue on these
grounds that the setting up of such a market
may be classified as a public good, thus
justifying government involvement. The
creation of a market for derivatives of
inflation-indexed products may help to further
develop the market and foster liquidity
(European Commission, 2003).
For monetary policy authorities, indexed bonds
allow the inflation expectations of market
participants to be deduced by comparing yields
on index-linked bonds with yields on nominal
bonds of the same maturity.14 Inferences on this
basis may be more reliable than those based on
other sources, such as interviews, as they
reflect actual decisions rather than mere
opinions. Furthermore, issuing indexed bonds
may reduce the incentives for governments to
put pressure on central banks to tolerate higher
inflation with a view to reducing the real value
of government debt,15 although a high degree of
central bank independence is a better safeguard
against this. Another consequence of issuing
indexed bonds could be a reduction in the
inflation aversion of investors, as they would14
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16 Guidotti (1992) described the circumstances under which the
likelihood increases that indexation will spread.
17 Governments committed to reducing inflation from high
levels have sometimes started issuing inflation-indexed bonds
to reinforce the credibility of their goal, e.g. Israel (1955) and
the United Kingdom (1981).
be protected against the direct adverse effects
of inflation (Uhlig, 1997). Moreover, inflation-
indexation could spread to other parts of the
economy, notably wage-setting, increasing
real wage rigidities.16 Support for monetary
policy aimed at price stability may decrease
(Pecchi and Piga, 1997) along with monetary
policy effectiveness if large parts of the
economy are insulated from the direct adverse
effects of inflation.
It can be argued that the introduction of the euro
should have reduced interest in inflation-
indexed bond following the lines of reasoning
above. A large number of safeguards against
high inflation have been introduced, such as the
ECB’s primary objective of price stability, the
independence of the ECB, the prohibition of
monetary financing and the no-bail-out clause.
The fact that the twelve national governments of
the euro area no longer have national institutions
as monetary counterparties but the ECB, which
focuses on euro area-wide developments, also
reduces the scope for governments to influence
monetary developments. As a result, fear among
investors of the erosion of the real value of
nominal debt should have been reduced.
Nevertheless, the market for indexed bonds is
growing rapidly. This can be explained by a
shift in incentives for issuers and investors
following the start of EMU. So far, cost savings
and establishing credibility17 had been the
major motivations for issuing this type of
bond, while the primary reason for investing in
it was protection against inflation risks. Now,
with low inflation expectations, portfolio
diversification has emerged as the main reason
to invest in indexed bonds (European
Commission, 2003). Indexed bonds are of
particular interest to pension funds, whose
future obligations are linked to nominal
developments because of the price or wage
indexation of pension benefits. Investing in
inflation-indexed bonds offers them the
opportunity to match liabilities with nominal
claims, thus reducing mismatches in the growth
of assets and liabilities due to inflation. For
governments, issuing indexed bonds may have
the advantage of establishing a reputation in a
market that potentially can grow rapidly in light
of the mounting importance of funded pension
systems, and of developing the market for this
product with possible private follow-ups.
Within the euro area, the number of countries
issuing inflation-indexed bonds (France,
Greece and Italy) is small but growing. France
has been issuing this type of bond since 1998,
linked to a domestic price index. Since 2001
bonds indexed to the euro area harmonised
index of consumer prices (euro area HICP,
excluding tobacco) have been offered with a
view to broadening the investor base. Issuance
statistics confirm that ownership of inflation-
indexed bonds is widely spread – some 75% of
the first French bond linked to the euro area
HICP was sold to non-residents, of which more
than half were investors from outside the euro
area. To ensure that sufficient liquidity
prevails in this market segment, the issuance
programme will be accelerated – eventually
some 10% of net bonds issued will be inflation-
indexed. Italy and Greece issued inflation-
indexed bonds with 5-year and 20-year
maturities respectively in 2003, while
Germany and the Netherlands are considering
this option. Although growing rapidly, the
share of inflation-indexed bonds in total debt is
still relatively small. In France, it represented
around 4% of total tradable central government
debt in 2003, while in Italy and Greece its share
of total government debt is below 1%.
A somewhat related type of debt, GDP-indexed
debt, has not yet seen the light of day. The main
advantage of this kind of debt would be to limit
the variation of the debt-to-GDP ratio, and thus
limit the risk of a debt crisis. In a recession,
when tax revenues are relatively low, GDP-
indexed bonds would only pay a low interest
rate, and thus keep government interest15
ECB




OF DEBT payments low.18 Obstfeld and Peri (1998)
discussed GDP-indexed bonds in the context of
limited adjustment mechanisms in Europe to
deal with asymmetric shocks. They suggested
issuing perpetual debt linked to nominal GDP,
and investing the proceeds internationally in a
diversified portfolio. In that way, a country
would be less vulnerable to economic shocks.
Potential disadvantages of GDP-indexed bonds
include fears of deliberate misreporting of
GDP and moral hazard, as the benefit to
governments of growing faster are reduced.
Furthermore, large government intervention
may be needed to create a market for GDP-
indexed bonds because of development costs
and the need to set standards.
6 CURRENCY DENOMINATION OF DEBT
The currency denomination of debt instruments
is less debated in the literature than the choice
between nominal and indexed bonds, although
there are similarities between indexed bonds
and foreign currency bonds (Gilson and
Gerard, 2002). Both types of security can be
seen as commitment devices, protecting
bondholders against domestic inflation and
thus weakening incentives for governments to
push for high inflation. Like indexed debt,
foreign exchange debt can be instrumental in
avoiding large variations in tax rates. Issuing
foreign currency debt is sometimes seen as
more advantageous if there is a strong positive
correlation between the domestic and foreign
economies. In such cases, the domestic
economy can appear to enjoy a free ride: higher
inflation in the foreign economy (e.g. to
alleviate the debt burden in that country) will
reduce the real burden of foreign currency
denominated debt in the domestic country
without incurring the negative reputational
consequences (Miller, 1997a).
The decision to issue debt in foreign currency
seems to be motivated by practical
considerations. These can include avoiding an
overburdening of the domestic capital market,
supplementing official foreign exchange
18 See Borensztein and Mauro (2002) for a discussion of the pros
and cons of this debt instrument.
reserves, increasing international ownership of
bonds, and taking advantage of better financing
conditions abroad. Claessens et al. (2003)
found that smaller economies, with narrower
domestic investor bases, take more recourse to
foreign currency debt. In the empirical work of
De Fontenay et al. (1995) lower interest rates
abroad compared to domestic rates were found
to have a positive effect on the foreign currency
debt share. Pecchi and Di Meana (1998),
testing various theories on the denomination of
debt, concluded that (expected) cost is a key
consideration in deciding whether to issue
foreign currency debt.
On the other hand, issuing non-domestic debt
is sometimes avoided for reasons of prestige,
as recourse to foreign currency debt may be
regarded as a sign of financial weakness.
Furthermore, cost advantages are not always
obvious in view of interest and exchange rate
fluctuations and liquidity premia to be paid
when a small issuer enters a relatively large
market. Swaps, however, can be used to reduce
excessive volatility in budgets resulting from
exchange rate or interest rate changes.
The relevance of many of these motives has
diminished in recent years in the euro area.
Integrated European capital markets and, until
recently, improved public finances have
relaxed fears of a crowding out of private
capital demand. With the advent of the euro,
countries also no longer need to issue securities
in another, non-domestic currency to attract
international investors. The credible price
stability objective of the independent central
bank has also reduced the need for foreign
currency debt as a commitment device, as
modelled by Gilson and Gerard (2002).
The attitudes of individual countries towards
borrowing in non-euro currencies still vary. In
some countries, reducing foreign currency
denominated debt is a stated part of the
debt management strategy (Belgium, Greece,16
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Ireland and Italy). A few other debt managers,
in search of favourable financing conditions,
either continue to use this option (Austria),19
or do not exclude it if conditions turn
favourable (Germany, Spain). Italy still issues
US dollar denominated securities with a view
to maintaining its benchmark status among
non-US sovereign issuers. A few countries, such
as the Netherlands, so far explicitly exclude the
financing of part of government debt in foreign
currencies. France lifted the prohibition on
borrowing in foreign currencies in 2003, and
Germany now also no longer excludes this
option. Countries issuing non-euro denominated
debt mostly use foreign exchange swaps to
reduce the exchange rate risk.
The share of debt denominated in non-euro
currencies, which stood at 2% in the euro area
at the end of 2002, continues to show a slightly
declining tendency. With the introduction of
the euro on 1 January 1999, debt previously
denominated in legacy currencies, representing
more than 3% of GDP, was automatically
re-denominated as domestic currency debt. The
main currencies in which foreign currency debt
is now denominated are US dollar, pound
sterling, Japanese yen and Swiss franc (see
Table 2). The share of foreign currency
denominated debt in 2002 exceeded 10% of
total central government debt only in Austria
(12%) and Finland (13%). Previously these
levels were much higher. In 1995, for instance,
the share of non-domestic currencies in total
central government debt exceeded 25% in
Belgium, Finland and Ireland.
Finally, it should be noted that the introduction
of the euro also had a major effect on debt
managers outside the euro area. Denmark and
Sweden (and the ten countries that joined the
European Union in May 2004) issue a
substantial part of their debt in euro or issue
debt in their domestic currency and then swap
it for euro. Box 2 briefly describes the role of
the euro in debt management in Denmark and
Sweden.
As % of total USD JPY GBP CHF
central government
debt (% of foreign currency denominated debt)
Austria 12.7 45 55
Belgium  2.1 5 21 74
Finland 13.2 36 29 28 7
France  0.0
Germany  0.0
Greece1)  2.8 61 15 6 18
Ireland  2.0 100
Italy  3.5 80 14 6
Luxembourg  5.0 100
Netherlands  0.0
Portugal  1.7 100
Spain  3.3 49 47 4
Euro area  2.0 52 19 10 19
Source: Annual reports of euro area debt managers.
1) After using foreign exchange swaps.
Table 2 Foreign currency denominated debt in euro area countries, 2002
19 According to the Austrian debt management office, the long-
term saving from using foreign currency markets ranges
between 1½ and 2% of GDP (Hauth and Kocher, 2001).17
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DEBT MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES IN DENMARK AND SWEDEN
In Denmark, around 12% of total central government debt was denominated in foreign currency
at the end of 2003. Foreign exchange denominated debt nowadays only relates to euros,
whereas before the coming of the euro, borrowing also took place in US dollars, Swiss francs,
Japanese Yen and national currencies of euro area countries. Part of the foreign currency debt
is issued directly in euro; another part is issued in Danish Krone and then swapped to euro. The
aim of issuing in euros is to maintain adequate foreign exchange reserves. Denmark
participates in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), with a fixed exchange rate
policy vis-à-vis the euro, maintaining a narrow band of ±2.25% around its central rate.
Stabilisation of the amount of foreign exchange debt is part of Denmark’s debt policy.
In Sweden, some 27% of central government debt is expressed in foreign currencies. Euro-
denominated debt accounts for around 65% of this, but debt also continues to be issued in US
dollars, Swiss francs, UK pounds, and Japanese Yen. The goal, however, is to reduce the share
of foreign-currency-denominated debt in total debt. Currently, Sweden does not participate in
the ERM. Most foreign currency debt is first issued in Swedish Krona, and then swapped into
foreign currencies.
20 In some cases, legal restrictions on pension funds were
effectively relaxed as the obligation to invest only in the
national currency automatically broadened with the advent of
the euro to include all euro area countries.
7 DEBT OWNERSHIP
Debt ownership is another topic in debt
management that has received relatively
little attention in the literature. Practical
considerations seem to dominate the decisions
of debt managers whether or not to actively
seek to attract non-domestic investors.
Attracting foreign investors now relies much
less on the currency in which debt is
denominated and more on the features of the
bond and the distribution channels. While
attracting foreign investors has not been a
major problem for the larger euro area
countries, for the smaller ones it presented a
relatively new situation.
Now that the euro is the domestic currency of
twelve countries and exchange rate risks and
costs have disappeared, the degree of national
bias in investor preferences has decreased.20
Exchange rate risks used to play a major role,
but non-standardised market conventions and
a lack of efficient pan-European settlement
systems also hampered international trade in
government bonds. Today government debt
managers are less certain about national
demand for their debt securities, forcing them
to enter into competition with other debt
managers. Portfolio managers are also
diversifying into a wider range of corporate
bonds because of tight spreads for government
bonds. Thus, government debt managers face
increased competition, requiring them to cater
for the desires of investors. Smaller countries
in particular have taken action to increase
interest in their products by, for example, using
road shows or by issuing only a few, large
bonds on a limited number of days.
Results indicate that ownership of government
debt is indeed much more widely spread than
before (see Chart 2). On average in the euro
area domestic ownership of total government
debt decreased from 75% in 1997 to 54% in
2003. A broadening of bond ownership has
occurred in most countries, but in the smaller18
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ones in particular. Over the period 1997-2002
foreign ownership of long-term government
debt in the Netherlands doubled to 56%, in
Spain it increased from 18% to 41%, and
in France non-residents’ share of marketable
debt rose to 36% from 15%.
8 ISSUING AND TRADING PRACTICES
The many changes in the environment in which
European debt managers work also have
implications for the more practical aspects
of debt management. This section briefly
describes some of the main changes in the
issuing and trading of government debt.21
Competition among debt managers has
increased because of progress made towards a
single capital market as a result of the euro.
Being able to finance government deficits on
favourable terms in this environment required
some changes in practices, aimed mainly at
increasing the liquidity of bonds issued. Apart
from creditworthiness, liquidity is the main
factor explaining cross-country differences in
the interest rates to be paid by governments.
Chart 2 Ownership of government debt in
the euro area
(% of GDP)
Source: ECB Monthly Bulletin.


























Increasing standardisation of market
conventions (e.g. day count basis, settlement
dates) leading up to EMU greatly improved the
comparability of government issues. Increased
focus on fully standardised, “plain vanilla”
securities, often with 5 or 10 year maturities,
also contributed to this. To increase
transparency, debt managers now usually
announce their issuance calendar well in
advance, often including the type of debt
instrument to be offered on specific dates.
Given these pre-commitments, the scope for
opportunistic issues, trying to take advantage
of temporary favourable market conditions, has
greatly decreased. Less progress has been made
regarding day-to-day issuance coordination.
Issuance calendars to some extent overlap,
especially in the early months of the year
when debt managers frontload their financing.
Smaller euro area countries in particular
may suffer disadvantages because of the
incomplete harmonisation of debt management
practices.
DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS
Increased competition in the primary and
secondary government bond markets has led
to changes in distribution channels. Primary
dealers and bank syndicates are now popular
means to reach more non-domestic investors.
Primary dealers mediate between the debt
agency and buyers in both the primary and
secondary markets. All euro area countries
except Germany now use primary dealers
to distribute government bonds. Tasks for
primary dealers usually include the obligation
to bid at auctions or to buy a certain amount of
newly issued bonds, promotion of government
debt and market making.22 In all countries
concerned, many foreign financial institutions
21 A more detailed presentation of recent changes in the
European bond markets is given in ECB (2004).
22 See Economic and Financial Committee (2000b) for more
information on the tasks and privileges of primary dealers in
Europe.19
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are included as primary dealers, reflecting the
wish to spread ownership of government
securities widely.
Bank syndicates have also become increasingly
popular as a way to distribute new government
debt, particularly when approaching new
market segments. Syndicate participants may
select specific investors to whom the
government security to be issued may be
especially interesting. For smaller countries, a
particular advantage is that a significant
amount can be placed at once, thus immediately
creating liquidity.
ELECTRONIC TRADING SYSTEMS
Liquidity in the secondary market has been
fostered by electronic trading systems. Since
its introduction in Italy in 1988, trade in
government securities via electronic trading
systems has spread to most countries. In
addition to these local systems, EuroMTS was
introduced in 1999, enabling quotation and
trading of some European benchmark bonds.
Obligations to provide quotes for some traders
have improved liquidity while maximum
bid-ask spreads have reduced transaction costs.
A requirement for trading on EuroMTS is a
bond size of at least €5 billion. To foster
liquidity in the markets, and to qualify for
participation in EuroMTS, the average size of
a bond issued by a central government has
increased substantially since the advent of
EMU. More recently, electronic systems have
been used not only for trading government
bonds but also as a platform to issue bonds.
Finally, government bonds and bills play a
major role in the European repo market, where
repurchase agreements are traded. Central
government debt constitutes about 87% of the
collateral underlying repo transactions in
Europe (ISMA, 2004). At the same time, large
repo markets support the liquidity of the
government securities market as they enable
traders to take positions in these markets. The
benchmark status of the German Bund in the
main 10-year bond segment amongst others
reflects the well-developed repo market for
these German bonds. Increasingly, repo trading
takes place on electronic trading platforms.
9 CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
Debt management strategies have changed
considerably in recent years, following the
introduction of the euro and declining
government debt ratios. The ultimate
objectives of debt management have remained
more or less the same, but financing debt
at low cost against acceptable risks in
this new environment required an adaptation
of strategies. Very practical considerations
regarding cost and risks continue to dominate
the objectives adopted, rather than tax or
deficit stabilisation as suggested in the
academic literature.
Although the histories and the institutional
positions of debt managers in the euro area
countries vary, a strong tendency towards
convergence can be observed in recent years. In
most cases, recent developments strengthened
trends that were already in place. Key aspects
of debt management that have changed in
recent years include the autonomy of debt
management agencies. Increased competition
in capital markets has speeded up this process,
although to different degrees. In line with this,
debt management agencies are being given
more precise strategic goals and guidelines,
often in the form of targets for or limits on
maturity or the refinancing risk. The average
maturities of outstanding debt in the euro area
are converging, with the average residual
maturity now close to six years. As debt
managers increasingly manage the duration of
debt through interest rate swaps, the average
maturity is less useful as an indication of the
interest sensitivity of public debt. Information
on the size of and the risk exposure to interest
swaps is often still lacking.
As to the types of government debt
instruments, index-linked debt is growing in
importance with more countries issuing this20
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type of debt than before and others considering
it. Portfolio diversification rather than cost
saving appears to be the prime reason for
issuing this type of debt, with pension funds
being major investors. Less emphasis is given
to issuing non-euro denominated debt given the
large pool of resources available in euro.
Foreign ownership of euro area government
debt has increased markedly, especially in
smaller euro area countries where in many
cases non-domestic ownership has more than
doubled in the space of five years. The
increased emphasis on liquidity aspects with a
view to securing the lowest possible funding
costs is reflected in issuance and trading
practices (plain vanilla bonds, primary dealers,
electronic trading).
While debt management practices in the
euro area are converging in many aspects,
some differences remain, reflecting different
operational objectives and sizes of deficits
and debts. Furthermore, the emphasis on
convergence has decreased somewhat lately,
reflecting a return to higher government
deficits and an increasing desire to innovate
to attract investors in niche areas.
Looking forward, euro area debt managers
will face some additional challenges in future.
With low deficits and competitive auction
data setting at the beginning of EMU, the
issue of coordination of debt management
practices in the euro area has arisen
(Giovannini Group, 2000), including ideas
about European sovereigns issuing common
bonds. Current high government deficits have
increased opportunities for regular issuances of
benchmark bonds, relegating discussions on
this type of coordination to the background, but
it may revive once public finances have been
put on a sounder footing.
Population ageing will have a noticeable effect
on government debt management. Higher
pension and health care spending will increase
deficits if no compensatory action is taken.
Indeed, countries have agreed on additional
efforts to reduce debt burdens to free up
resources that would otherwise be spent on
interest payments. At the same time, demand
for government debt, and for (very) long-term
index-linked debt in particular, is bound to rise
because of the building up of pension funds,
which will be keen to invest part of the
entrusted money in safe government assets.21
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Manager Institutional position classification Website
Austria Österreichische Part of the Ministry SMO www.oebfa.co.at
Bundesfinanzierungsagentur of Finance
Belgium Service de la dette Part of the Federal DMO www.treasury.fgov.be/
publique/Federale Dienst Public Service Finance  interdette
van de Staatsschuld
Finland Valtiokonttori The State Treasury is DMO www.valtiokonttori.fi/
(State Treasury) supervised by the rahpa/bulletin/bulletin.htm
Ministry of Finance
France Agence France Trésor Part of the Ministry DMO www.aft.gouv.fr
of Economic Affairs,
Finance and Industry
Germany Bundesrepublik Deutschland Limited company with SMO www.deutsche-
– Finanzagentur GmbH the German State, finanzagentur.de/eng/
represented by the Federal
Ministry of Finance,
as sole shareholder.
Greece General Accounting Office Part of the Ministry of DMO www.mof-glk.gr/
Economy and Finance en/home.htm
Ireland National Treasury The Chief Executive is SMO www.ntma.ie
Management Agency appointed by the
Minister for Finance
and is directly responsible
to him
Italy Dipartimento del Tesoro Part of the Ministry DMO www.tesoro.it/publicdebt
of Economy and Finance
Luxembourg Trésorerie de l’Etat Part of the Ministry of Finance DMO  www.etat.lu/TS/
Netherlands Agentschap van het Part of the Ministry DMO www.dutchstate.nl
ministerie van Financiën of Finance, but with
much autonomy
Portugal Instituto de Gestão do Part of the Ministry of Finance SMO www.igcp.pt
Crédito Público
Spain Tesoro Público Part of the Ministry DMO www.mineco.es/tesoro/
of Economy and Finance htm/deuda/index_en.htm
Source: Currie et al. (2003) and own classifications.
Note: SMO = “special debt management office”, a separate unit outside the Ministry of Finance to which operational responsibilities
are delegated. DMO = “debt management office”, a unit with no such delegation.22
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 25
March 2005
Angeletos, G. (2002), “Fiscal Policy with Non-Contingent Debt and the Optimal Maturity
Structure”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 (3), pp. 1105-1131.
Barro, R. (1999), “Notes on Optimal Debt Management”, Journal of Applied Economics, 2,
pp. 281-289.
Blanco, R. (2001), “The Euro-Area Government Securities Markets. Recent Developments and
Implications for Market Functioning”, Banco de España Working Paper, No. 120.
Borensztein, E. and P. Mauro (2002), “Reviving the Case for GDP-Indexed Bonds”, IMF Policy
Discussion Paper, No. 10.
Calvo, G. C. and P. E. Guidotti (1990), “Indexation and Maturity of Government Bonds: An
Explanatory Model”, in R. Dornbusch and M. Draghi, Public Management: Theory and
History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 52-82.
Campbell, J. and R. Shiller (1996), “A Scorecard for Indexed Government Debt”, Cowles
Foundation Discussion Paper, No. 1125.
Claessens, S., D. Klingebiel and S. Schmukler (2003), “Government Bonds in Domestic and
Foreign Currency: The Role of Macroeconomic and Institutional Factors”, CEPR
Discussion Paper, No. 3789.
Codogno, L., C. Favero and A. Missale (2003), “Yield Spreads on EMU Government Bonds”,
Economic Policy, No. 18, pp. 503-532.
Currie, E., J-J. Dethier and E. Togo (2003), “Institutional Arrangements for Public Debt
Management”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 3021.
De Fontenay, P., G. Milesi-Ferretti and H. Pill (1995), “The Role of Foreign Currency Debt in
Public Debt Management”, IMF Working Paper, No. 95/21.
Drudi, F. and R. Giordano (2000), “Default Risk and Optimal Debt Management”, Journal of
Banking and Finance, 24, pp. 861-891.
Economic and Financial Committee (2000a), Progress Report on EU Government Bond
Instruments, Brussels.
Economic and Financial Committee (2000b), Progress Report on Primary Dealership in EU
Public Debt Management, Brussels.
European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, several issues.
European Central Bank (2003), “Recent Developments in the Market for Index-Linked Bonds in
the Euro Area”, Monthly Bulletin, December.
European Central Bank (2004), The Euro Bond Market Study.
REFERENCES23
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 25
March 2005
 REFERENCES
European Commission (2003), “Special Feature: Index-linked Bonds”, Quarterly Note on the
Euro-Denominated Bond Markets, January-March 2003, Brussels.
European Commission (2004), Autumn 2004 Economic Forecasts, Brussels.
Falcetti, E. and A. Missale (2002), “Public Debt Indexation and Denomination with an
Independent Central Bank”, European Economic Review, 46(10), pp. 1825-50.
Favero, C., A. Missale and G. Piga (1999), “EMU and Public Debt Management: One Money, One
Debt?”, CEPR Policy Paper, No. 3.
Gilson, N. and M. Gerard (2002), “Currency Composition and Public Debt in EMU”, IFO Studien,
48 (2), pp. 301-321.
Giovannini Group (2000). Co-ordinated Public Debt Issuance in the Euro Area – Report of the
Giovannini Group, http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/ publications/giovannini/
giovannini081100en.pdf.
Guidotti, P. (1992), “Wage and Public Debt Indexation”, IMF Working Paper, No. 92/7.
Haan, J. de, B. Sikken and A. Hilder (1995), “On the Relationship between the Debt Ratio and
Debt Maturity”, Applied Economics Letters, 2, pp. 484-486.
Hauth, E. and P. A. Kocher (2001), “Austria’s Sovereign Debt-Management Against the
Background of Euro Area Financial Markets”, Focus on Austria, ONB, 2, pp. 159-176.
ISMA (2004), European Repo Market Survey, No. 7, October.
Ladekarl, J. and A. Svennesen (1999), “Interest Rate Swaps and Domestic Government Debt
Management in Denmark”, OECD Financial Market Trends, June, pp. 155-174.
Leong, D. (1999), “Debt Management – Theory and Practice”, UK Treasury Occasional Paper,
No. 18.
Lumpkin, S. (2000), “Recent Innovations in Government Debt Management Techniques and
Practices and Government Securities Markets”, OECD Financial Market Trends, No. 75,
pp. 63-76.
Miller, V. (1997a), “Why a Government Might Want to Consider Foreign Currency Denominated
Debt?”, Economic Letters, 55, pp. 247-250.
Miller, V. (1997b), “Political Instability and Debt Maturity”, Economic Inquiry, 35 (1),
pp. 121-127.
Missale, A. and O. Blanchard (1994), “The Debt Burden and Debt Maturity”, American Economic
Review, 84(1), pp. 309-19.
Missale, A. (1999), Public Debt Management, Oxford University Press, Oxford.24
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 25
March 2005
Missale, A. (2000), “Optimal Debt Management with a Stability and Growth Pact”, Public
Finance and Management, 1 (1), pp. 58-91.
Missale, A. (2001), “Public Debt Management and the Stability and Growth Pact”, in A. Brunila,
M. Buti and D. Franco (eds.), The Stability and Growth Pact – The Architecture of Fiscal
Policy in EMU, Palgrave, New York, pp. 44-68.
Obstfeld, M. and G. Peri (1998), “Regional Non-Adjustment and Fiscal Policy”, in “EMU:
Prospects and Challenges for the Euro”, Economic Policy, No. 26, pp. 206-247.
OECD (2003), Central Government Debt, Statistical Yearbook, 1992-2001.
Pecchi, L. and G. Piga (1997), “Who’s Afraid of Index-Linked Bonds”, in M. D. Cecco, L. Pecchi
and G. Piga (eds.), Managing Public Debt: Index-Linked Bonds in Theory and Practice,
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham.
Pecchi, L., and A. di Meana (1998), “Public Foreign Currency Debt: A Cross-Country Evaluation
of Competing Theories”, Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia, No. 2,
September.
Piga, G. (1999), “Public Debt Management in the European Monetary Union”, LUISS, OCSM
working paper, paper prepared for the European Commission.
Piga, G. (2001), Derivatives and Public Debt Management, ISMA, Zurich.
Price, R. (1997), “The Rationale and Design of Inflation-Indexed Bonds”, IMF Working Paper,
No. 97/12.
Remolona, E. M. and P. D. Wooldridge (2003), “The Euro Interest Rate Swap Market”, BIS
Quarterly Review, March, pp. 47-57.
Santillán, J., M. Bayle and C. Thygesen (2000), “The Impact of the Euro on Money and Bond
Markets”, ECB Occasional Paper, No. 1.
Shen, P. (1995), “Benefits and Limitations of Inflation Indexed Treasury Bonds”, Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, Third Quarter, pp. 41-56.
Tobin, J. (1963), “An Essay on Principles of Debt Management”, Fiscal and Debt Management
Policies, Englewood Cliffs, pp. 143-218.
Uhlig, H. (1997), “Long-Term Debt and the Political Support for a Monetary Union”, CEPR
Discussion Paper Series, No. 1603.25
ECB




1 “The impact of the euro on money and bond markets” by J. Santillán, M. Bayle and
C. Thygesen, July 2000.
2 “The effective exchange rates of the euro” by L. Buldorini, S. Makrydakis and C. Thimann,
February 2002.
3 “Estimating the trend of M3 income velocity underlying the reference value for monetary
growth” by C. Brand, D. Gerdesmeier and B. Roffia, May 2002.
4 “Labour force developments in the euro area since the 1980s” by V. Genre and
R. Gómez-Salvador, July 2002.
5 “The evolution of clearing and central counterparty services for exchange-traded
derivatives in the United States and Europe: a comparison” by D. Russo,
T. L. Hart and A. Schönenberger, September 2002.
6 “Banking integration in the euro area” by I. Cabral, F. Dierick and J. Vesala,
December 2002.
7 “Economic relations with regions neighbouring the euro area in the ‘Euro Time Zone’” by
F. Mazzaferro, A. Mehl, M. Sturm, C. Thimann and A. Winkler, December 2002.
8 “An introduction to the ECB’s survey of professional forecasters” by J. A. Garcia,
September 2003.
9 “Fiscal adjustment in 1991-2002: stylised facts and policy implications” by M. G. Briotti,
February 2004.
10 “The acceding countries’ strategies towards ERM II and the adoption of the euro:
an analytical review” by a staff team led by P. Backé and C. Thimann and including
O. Arratibel, O. Calvo-Gonzalez, A. Mehl and C. Nerlich, February 2004.
11 “Official dollarisation/euroisation: motives, features and policy implications of current
cases” by A. Winkler, F. Mazzaferro, C. Nerlich and C. Thimann, February 2004.
12 “Understanding the impact of the external dimension on the euro area: trade, capital flows and
other international macroeconomic linkages“ by R. Anderton, F. di Mauro and F. Moneta,
March 2004.
13 “Fair value accounting and financial stability” by a staff team led by A. Enria and including
L. Cappiello, F. Dierick, S. Grittini, A. Maddaloni, P. Molitor, F. Pires and P. Poloni,
April 2004.
14 “Measuring Financial Integration in the Euro Area” by L. Baele, A. Ferrando, P. Hördahl,
E. Krylova, C. Monnet, April 2004.26
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 25
February 2005
15 “Quality adjustment of European price statistics and the role for hedonics” by H. Ahnert and
G. Kenny, May 2004.
16 “Market dynamics associated with credit ratings: a literature review” by F. Gonzalez, F. Haas,
R. Johannes, M. Persson, L. Toledo, R. Violi, M. Wieland and C. Zins, June 2004.
17 “Corporate ‘Excesses’ and financial market dynamics” by A. Maddaloni and D. Pain, July 2004.
18 “The international role of the euro: evidence from bonds issued by non-euro area residents” by
A. Geis, A. Mehl and S. Wredenborg, July 2004.
19 “Sectoral specialisation in the EU a macroeconomic perspective” by MPC task force of the
ESCB, July 2004.
20 “The supervision of mixed financial services groups in Europe” by F. Dierick, August 2004.
21 “Governance of securities clearing and settlement systems” by D. Russo, T. Hart,
M. C. Malaguti and C. Papathanassiou, October 2004.
22 “Assessing potential output growth in the euro area: a growth accounting perspective”
by A. Musso and T. Westermann, January 2005.
23 “The bank lending survey for the euro area” by J. Berg, A. van Rixtel, A. Ferrando,
G. de Bondt and S. Scopel, February 2005.
24 “Wage diversity in the euro area: an overview of labour cost differentials across
industries” by V. Genre, D. Momferatou and G. Mourre, February 2005.
25 “Government debt management in the euro area: recent theoretical developments and changes
in practices” by G. Wolswijk and J. de Haan, March 2005.